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RES JUDICATA AND MULTI-STATE 
INTEGRATION 
Lea Brilmayer* 
CIVIL JUDGMENT RECOGNITION AND THE INTEGRATION OF MULTI-
PLE-STATE ASSOCIATIONS: CENTRAL AMERICA, THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY. 
By Robert' C Casad. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas. 
1981. Pp. xiii, 258. $25. 
When Central America comes up in conversation these days, it 
isn't usually with regard to the law of res judicata. For this reason, 
Robert Casad's recent book on civil judgment recognition is likely to 
provoke some strange reactions. True, the book's title suggests that 
its subject is European and American law in equal proportions with 
Central American. But sources on European and American law are 
relatively easy to find: the book's distinctive contribution, to which 
most of its pages are dedicated, is its description and analysis of the 
law of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
and Panama. During this time of political unrest and human rights 
controversy, a book on local judgments law has a macabre tinge. Res 
judicata is a quintessentially technical subject, while the profound 
political controversies the area has generated transcenq mere legal-
isms, to say the least. Yet if Casad's hypotheses are sound, this ap-
parently technical book is more timely than at first it might appear. 
The book treats civil judgment recognition as one manifestation 
of the extent of integration of member states into a federated union. 
Civil judgment recognition is taken as a sign of healthy intra-federa-
tion relations. The first chapter, accordingly, is a summary historical 
account of the recurrent efforts of the Central American nations to 
organize politically into a common union. Special attention is given 
to the frequent reciprocal promises, in treaty provisions, to honor the 
judgments of other Central American nations, and to attempts to 
found a super-national judicial apparatus to implement these trea-
ties. These attempts all failed eventually, although the interim suc-
cess of some was considerable. Casad does not clearly spell out the 
reasons for the failures. In at least one case, the disintegration was 
attributable to United States interventionist policies (pp. 8-9). Al-
though it is hard to know for certain, the other failures may have 
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been caused by the social and cultural differences among the nations, 
which the author develops at the outset in order to refute appear-
ances of homogeneity (pp. 1-2). It would have been interesting had 
Casad pursued this inquiry further - but then, he did not intend to 
write a history book. 
Most of the remainder of the book concerns the Bustamante 
Code, a treaty governing interstate judgment recognition in Central 
America, and the meaning the Code has been given in the various 
Central American nations. If the book contained no more than this 
material, it would nevertheless be a significant contribution to the 
literature. Solely as an introduction to one system's judgment law, it 
would constitute a useful reference book. Americans, of course, 
have few opportunities to acquaint themselves with this material. 
Language differences are not the primary problem, although, of 
course, it doesn't help that the primary and secondary literature is in 
Spanish. More significant is the fact that the concepts, while some-
times bearing familiar names, are actually quite different. One ex-
ample Casad discusses is "cosa juzgada," which sounds like "res 
judicata" but bears an entirely different, civil law, meaning (p. 45). 
Various jurisdictional doctrines pose the same problem.1 To be hon-
est, I found myself as mystified after the author's explanations of the 
concepts as before. But then, the author himself acknowledges the 
difficulties and ambiguities - and would any nutshell explanation 
of American collateral estoppel be completely clear to citizens of 
civil law countries? If nothing else, one gains an appreciation of the 
fact that differences exist, and that one ought not to take apparent 
similarities for more than they are worth. 
One reason, then, to read the book might be to learn some law 
from a part of the world that has not thus far been of sufficient com-
mercial interest to spawn a large legal literature. It is not entirely 
clear, however, what will be the practical utility of a working knowl-
edge of Salvadoran judgment law. At any rate, the book aims 
higher. Its title, after all, is general: "Civil Judgment Recognition 
and the Integration of Multiple-State Associations." Its subtitle is 
scarcely less general, denominating Central America, the European 
Community, and the United States. Thus the second chapter, pre-
ceding the material on the laws of the various Central American na-
tions, sets out theoretical and policy considerations underlying the 
law of judgments. And the tenth chapter, following the descriptive 
material, sets out to gauge the effectiveness of the Central American 
apparatus by comparing its operation to that of the United States 
and the European Common Market. The fact that there are only 
cursory descriptions of those two systems, in contrast to the wealth of 
detail on the individual Central American nations, is not a problem. 
1. See, for example, his discussion of competency. P. 45. 
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The typical reader brings to such a book so much more knowledge of 
American and European systems than Central American arrange-
ments that detailed description of the former might be a waste of 
time. Yet, setting aside the contrasting numbers of pages spent, one 
still comes away with the sense that this is, really, just a book on 
Central American judgments law. The reason, I think, is that the 
overarching theoretical analysis is so thin. 
Casad describes how in each system a judgment for money dam-
ages rendered in a sister-nation would be enforced. He mentions, for 
instance, the fact that in the United States a judgment enforcement 
action is a contentious adversary proceeding (pp. 138-39), while in 
Europe the defendant is not in the first instance entitled to notice 
and an opportunity to defend. This tends to make judgment en-
forcement less automatic, less certain, and more costly in the United 
States than in the European Community. Proceedings in Central 
American countries are more contentious still, since Article 426 of 
the Bustamonte Code gives the state itself a right to intervene (p. 
140). Such comparisons are highly interesting: they challenge force-
fully our unexamined notions about how things "have" to be. Yet 
for two reasons, these thoughts just whet the reader's appetite. 
First, we would want to know the true relationship between 
friendly foreign relations and cooperative enforcement of judgments. 
This is a question about how legal doctrine and the cultural, social, 
and political order influence each other. It seems somewhat plausi-
ble that effective judgments enforcement might be symptomatic of 
harmonious international relations, and harmonious relations a sign 
of social homogeneity or at least cultural understanding. Con-
versely, countries at odds might decline to recognize one another's 
sovereign acts. But is this true? And if it is true, then how true? For 
instance, how much must relations deteriorate ( or cultures diverge) 
before an impact is felt on mutual judgment enforcement? The hy-
pothesized connection in fact might be quite tenuous. 
For instance, even if two nations were at war they might rou-
tinely enforce one another's judgments. The reason would be that 
disregard for judgments is not a particularly effective pressure tactic. 
If anything, it is symbolic. And the impact is mainly felt by litigants, 
who may not have anything to do with the cause of the international 
friction and who may even, in fact, be from the country in which 
enforcement is sought. Casad recognizes this last point: he argues 
that reciprocity is not a wise requirement in enforcement law for just 
this reason (p. 20). Yet doesn't this suggest that enforcement is a 
purely private matter, advancing or hindering the interests of liti-
gants with no discernible effect on public interests? Why, indeed, 
does the rendering state "care" about its judgments - its resources 
are not being wasted by a second litigation. Its resources are a sunk 
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cost, and if the enforcing state compels relitigation its waste of time 
is its own problem. To put it bluntly, does judgments law matter, 
even in the context of international relations? 
Second, the comparisons that Casad makes are not the only ones 
possible. In fact, they may be the wrong ones. He focuses primarily 
on the ease of enforcement of a sister-state judgment in the various 
systems. But ease of enforcement of a sister-state judgment may 
only reflect the enforcing state's attitude toward that kind of judg-
ment as a matter oflocal res judicata law. An example will illustrate 
this problem. Many states of the United States treat child custody 
awards as readily modifiable; they are difficult, in other words, to 
enforce as rendered because states recognize a variety of defenses 
such as changed circumstances. 2 Assume that all of the member 
states in System I enforce child custody awards automatically while 
all of the states in System II enforce them only after reconsideration. 
Then if we compare the intra-systemic enforcement of such cases in 
System I to intra-systemic enforcement in System II, we might erro-
neously conclude that System I is more cooperative, more tightly in-
tegrated, than System IL Yet the "cooperativeness" thus identified 
in System I is only an artifact of the more restrictive local foreclosure 
rules in System I. The fact that interstate recognition of judgments 
in the United States is a cumbersome adversary process shows noth-
ing about relations among the states if intra-state recognition is an 
equally cumbersome adversary process. Comparisons between the 
former and non-adversary European proceedings may be 
misleading. 
I am not suggesting that Casad is unaware of this sort of refine-
ment: there is no evidence that he has confused these issues, except 
for the fact that he does not himself attempt to disentangle them. 
The major disappointment of this book is not its failure of cultural 
or political analysis, to which it does not seem to seriously aspire. 
Its greatest fault is the incompleteness of the theoretical analysis of 
doctrine, at which the book makes an ambitious start and for which 
it provides a wealth of raw material. In the effort to show the ana-
lytic potential of Casad's creative choice of topic, I would venture a 
few more thoughts about how intra-systemic cooperation in the con-
text of judgments enforcement might be analyzed. 
In evaluating intra-systemic coordination, we must take into ac-
count purely local effects. Treatment of sister-state judgments may 
reflect only an attitude toward judgments generally, when what we 
are really interested in is the treatment of sister-state judgments as 
such. In other words, we are interested in a comparison between 
comparisons. Within each system, we can compare the way each 
2. See generally R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CoNFLICT OF LAWS ch. 6 (3d ed. 
1981). 
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state treats its sister-state's judgments. To measure the degree of in-
tegration of a system, we need to compare this degree of cooperation 
(itself a comparison) to the degrees found in other systems, such as 
the amount of respect accorded to domestic judgments: 
Deference to Prior Court 
in sister state (inter-
state recognition) 
Degree of Integration = ---------
Deference to Prior Court 
in same state (local res 
judicata rules).3 
Actually, there are at least two further refinements. The first is 
that increased interstate recognition may be a product of adoption 
of the rendering state's res judicata rules. The above model suggests 
that the most fully integrated system is the one in which a state treats 
a foreign judgment as it would treat its own: a nondiscrimination 
model. In fact, however, a cooperative state might attempt to give a 
sister-state's judgment exactly the same effect as the rendering state 
would have, adhering to the rendering state's res judicata rules along 
with its judgment. Thus interstate recognition (the extent of the 
present court's deference to the prior decision in a sister-state) might 
be compared to a hypothetical present court of that sister-state ad-
dressing enforcement of the judgment in question. The measure of 
integration would then be: 
Deference to Prior Court 
in sister state (inter-
state recognition) 
Degree of Integration = -----------
Deference to present 
sister-state determination 
(sister-state res judicata rules). 
Neither measure of integration is obviously the better, or the more 
"cooperative." The first focuses on the presence or absence of dis-
crimination. The second measures the extent to which rights vest.4 
If two systems aspire to different ideals of cooperation, then compar-
ing them involves comparing apples and oranges. Each may be mar-
velously cooperative in its own sort of way. 
As a second refinement, if we truly wish to measure the degree of 
integration within a system, we might compare rules regarding com-
pletely foreign judgments. For example, Alabama may be perfectly 
happy to enforce New York's judgments. But in determining 
3. The division sign is used here metaphorically, to indicate comparison of relative 
strengths. It does not signify that actual number values might be assigned. 
4. See Brilmayer, State Fo,feiture Rules and Federal Review of State Criminal Convictions, 
49 U. CHI. L. REV. 741 (1982). 
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whether this evidences intra-systemic cooperation within the United 
States, we might be interested to know whether this fact is attributa-
ble to New York's status as a member of our federal union. How, in 
comparison, does Alabama treat French judgments? We might 
therefore construct another measure of cooperation: 
Deference to Prior Court 
in sister-state (inter-
state recognition) 
Degree of Integration = ---------
Deference to Prior Court 
in non-federated state. 
This would express the purely intra-systemic aspects of the degree of 
integration. 
Obviously, there is a great deal that might be said about coopera-
tion within groups of nations. By drawing attention to the similari-
ties and differences among three sets of cooperating sovereign 
entities, Casad's book raises powerful issues that any conflict of laws 
or international law scholar should want to address. By failing to 
provide theoretical structure, however, it falls short of success at its 
ambitious project. 
